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Abstract
Ottomanism as an ideology and way of life is nothing but a pale copy of Byzantinism.
Ottomanism is the direct successor of the Eastern Roman Empire (the Byzantine
Empire), which is the legal and sole successor to the only Roman Empire. But
Ottomanism itself has not been sufficiently studied because much more attention has
been paid to the way the Ottoman Empire was governed than to the identities that it
sought to define as its own, which were in fact nothing more than a faint copy of
Byzantinism before 1204.
Ottomanism can be defined as the imperial identity of the Ottoman Empire. But what
is more interesting is the fact that the same identity is the successor of the Byzantine
one — that is, Roman imperial identity, which did not recognize cultures and ethnicities.
And Ottomanism is a solid basis for the development of the specific Balkan nationalism
today, which is also known as Balkanism. A comparative analysis of the Ottomanism
with Byzantinism and with the modern science of nations and nationalism will prove
the hypothesis that: Ottomanism is the foundation for the modern Balkan nationalism.
Key words: Ottomanism, Balkanism, nationalism, ethnicity, nation, identity,
Byzantinism
Byzantinism as an Introduction to Ottomanism
Byzantinism — the constructed East Roman identity of the Byzantine Empire — is a
perennial connection of this empire with the Roman Empire. This connection can only
be defined as terminus technicus because the Byzantine Empire is the natural successor
to the Roman Empire.1
What is more interesting is the fact that in order to create that so-called Byzantine
identity, a connection was forged between the Latin and the classical Greek and
Hellenistic culture. Analyzing Byzantinism, it can be concluded that it is merely an
artificial construction of identity imposed on the subjects of the empire in order to unite
them under the rule of the emperor in Constantinople.
1

Conev, B. (2018). Byzantinism as Fundament of the Balkanism in (2018) Hiperboreea Journal vol. 5,
num. 1. Bucharest: Balkan History Association. pp.17-32.

24

Number 86, Spring 2022

Constructing this Byzantine identity during the Palaiologan dynasty (1261-1453), the
authorities in Constantinople realized that the population of the empire, apart from
imperial rule, must unite culturally and ethnically in order to preserve its unity.
However, this way of imagined unification in Byzantine Empire actually represents the
beginning of its end.
It led to a process of the annihilation of the imperial power itself because if until 1204
the emperor was the unifying element of the entire population in the empire, after 1261
the unifying element began to be embodied through the revival of classical Greek and
Hellenistic culture — giving less importance to the heritage of Rome upon which the
Byzantine Empire itself was founded.
Considering more structurally the idea of Byzantinism as a basis for Ottomanism, and
later as a basic element of modern Balkanism, it can be concluded that the change in
the view of the state provides the basis for the biggest problem in the Balkans today —
that is, the ethnic intolerance between different groups in the region. If until the Fourth
Crusade of 1202-1204, in Byzantine Empire the emperor himself was a unifying factor
for the group that defines itself as “rhomaioi”, 2 and not the language, traditions or
culture, it means that the Byzantine state applied modernism as a theory for determining
and defining the nation
In fact, the transition from a perennial to a modern interpretation of the unity of the
Byzantine population took place at the same time when it was beginning to sever its
historical ties with Rome, when the city fell to the barbarians in 476. Although
declaratively and legally, the Byzantine Empire until the end of its days is considered
the successor of Rome and the sole bearer of its heritage, the removal of Roman heritage
such as culture, Latin language, traditions and customs and the turn to imperialism
signify that in the empire is happening a reversal that in itself contributes to changing
the self-determination of the population living in that country.
Moving from a perennial to a modern interpretation of the identifying elements of the
population means that in the period before the restoration of the empire by the
Palaiologos in 1261 for the Byzantine Empire, although the modernist determination
that “modern man is neither loyal to the ruler, nor to the state, nor to religion as it is
loyal to culture”3 was not valid, however, according to the adherents of this theory, what
connects the group is the general legal-economic framework in the country, as well as
the language with the help of which the society itself is promoted.
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This creation of the so-called Byzantinism means that the Byzantine emperors were
successful in not allowing any ethnic group in the empire to have supremacy over the
others, i.e., they managed to separate the pre-national (ethnic) self-identification of the
population from the state bodies in order not to suppress the multiethnic character of
the state.4 In this way, for several centuries, the creation of protonationalism, which is
in fact a mixture of nationalism and populism, was prevented.5
The beginning of Byzantinism and the end of Byzantine Empire began when in the year
1261 Michael VIII conquered Constantinople and was proclaimed Emperor. In order
to rebuild the empire, the Palaiologos began to transform it as a Greek nation-state while
hegemonizing its Hellenic identity over the other cultural identities of the various
groups in Byzantine Empire6.
That is the start of the so-called revival of Hellenism which would in fact lead to
disobedience of other groups to the empire in Constantinople and a reluctance to support
it in the struggle against the Ottomans. In fact, it can be concluded that the change in
the interpretation of identities in the Byzantine Empire from perennial (i.e., modernist)
to ethnosymbolistic (i.e., primordial) leads to its collapse after several centuries.7
In the same way that Constantinople is perennially connected with Rome, so the
Ottomans after the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 try to be perennially connected
with the heritage of the Byzantine Empire. It is the perennial connection that means
that in these two empires they do not grow into nation-states in which one ethnicity
manages to assimilate the others, as was the case with the Byzantine Empire during the
reign of the Palaiologos (1261-1453). However, the connection is made in a way that
indicates to the population the historical continuity of the state, which allows it, despite
identifying with its own culture and values, to identify itself with the imperial
government that comes directly to the sovereign in Constantinople.
This way of perennial connection actually aims to show the permanence of the empire
that would contribute to achieve inner peace in it. Consistency, in contrast to
cyclicality, also contributes to the connection of the population with each other.
Namely, in both empires, the Byzantine Empire before 1204 and the Ottoman Empire
after 1453, the populations were allowed to identify with their local identities, but
within the limits set by the emperor in Constantinople, in order not to allow
strengthening ethnic identity in relation to imperial power.
4
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To achieve this effect, for the Byzantine Empire before 1204 and for the Ottoman
Empire after 1453, the unifying element was religion. For the Byzantine Empire, it was
Orthodoxy;8 for the Ottomans, it was the millet system according to which every single
subject who practices one of the recognized Abrahamic religions in the empire can be
identified as a subject of the padishah.9
The only difference between this type of Byzantinism and the early Ottomanism that
originated after 1453 is that in the Byzantine Empire the only accepted and recognized
religion is Orthodox Christianity, and in the Ottoman Empire according to the millet
system, it is Islam, Orthodox Christianity and later Judaism. In fact, the difference
occurs in that segment in the development of the states that Orthodoxy in Byzantine
Empire itself generates cultural values that are generally acceptable to all the
population,10 i.e. it also generates identity attributes that although common to different
ethnicities, have penetrated deep into the identity of modern Balkan nations.
Unlike the Byzantine Empire, in the Ottoman Empire, the millet system of religious
subdivision does not allow the generation of generally accepted values in all three
religious groups that would later be transferred to the national identities of the nations
that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.11
When comparing Byzantinism and Ottomanism it can be said that the biggest difference
between these two imperial identities, which have never grown into national ones, is
that, although the starting point for both is the perennial interpretation of the identity of
all the population, the Byzantinism later from perennial-modernist grows into a
primordial12 one which aims to emphasize the common organic-biological13,14 origin of
all subjects, i.e. through the hegemony of Hellenism to create the so-called ByzantineGreek nation.15
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Unlike Byzantinism, Ottomanism has no possibility of overcoming the perennial (i.e.
modernist) idea of the existence of the empire because there is no possibility for the
ethnic groups living in the Balkans to be organically and biologically linked to the
Ottoman Turks, Arabs and other non-Orthodox groups in the empire.16 Precisely for
this reason, Ottomanism never gained momentum in the Ottoman Empire, except in the
early 20th century during the Young Turk Revolution (1908) when the idea that the
Ottoman state was a state of the Turks, that is, the birth of the so-called TurkishOttoman nationalism.17 Yet it is only a brief period of a few years before the collapse
of the empire.
The inability to make a primordial connection with the states (i.e., cultures that
historically lived on the territory of the Balkans) opens the door for the Ottomans to
take advantage of the perennial connection. As pointed out above in this text, the
perennial connection allows them to consolidate the imperial power of the padishah in
Constantinople, in order to “justify their existence in this part of the world.”18 In this
way, Ottomanism becomes a modified addition to that Byzantinism that was before
1204 — that is, it becomes a systematic continuation of the imperial policy of
oppression of the peoples and their cultural degradation as opposed to the connection
on religious grounds.19 Cultural degradation occurs not because of the hegemonizing
of a particular culture as in the case of Byzantinism, but because of the hegemonization
and favoritism of Islam as a religion, which in itself generates cultural values and
traditions in a similar way to Orthodox Christianity.20
Skillfully avoiding primordialism, because they would never be able to justify the
organic-biological connection between the Turkish and Asian populations with the
autochthonous Orthodox Greek and Slavic population in the Balkans,21 the Ottomans
managed to create a specific process of forming collective memory in the Balkan
population, which is reflected to this day in the generated worship of the ruler — that
is, of the hegemonic religious group.22
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This change in the collective memory also contributed to changes in the collective
memory of the Balkan nations, which were recognized as separate in the 19th century
and began to fight for secession from the empire, so that in the collective memory of all
Balkan nations, the Ottoman period of their history has great pejorative significance.
The pejorative for the Ottomans, (i.e., the Turks) contributes to the transformation of
the perception of the Balkan nations for all of their neighbors because the the imperial
government’s skillful manipulation of certain ethnicities and groups in the Balkans in
the past contributed to growing intolerance and tension among Balkan nations today.
Ethno-confessional Identity as a Basis for the Division and Functioning of the
Ottoman Empire
The Ottoman “millet system” (i.e., the division of groups in the country according to
the religious affiliation) in historiography and political science) is known as the most
prominent precedent for formulating cultural (i.e., ethno-confessional) autonomy of
different groups in a state.23 In fact, this system of a division of the population is a
religious but also ethnic-linguistic autonomy of the different ethnicities (i.e., religious
groups) in the Ottoman Empire.
The millet system draws its strength from and is based on the Ottoman multicultural
and multireligious aspect of the population in the Ottoman Empire; it is not built as a
basic social concept for the functioning of that state. This way of state and social order
is based on the concept of dividing the largest religious communities in such way that
each of them would have the status of a legal entity in the state bureaucracy and with
the recognition of each “millet” it receives certain privileges from the ruler.24
However, when it comes to privileges, this applies only to the Muslim population in the
country, because it is defined as a basic entity without which the Ottoman Empire could
not exist. The millet was actually a kind of inclusive system that brought together
people of the same religion no matter what province in which they lived. Constituted
as the basic administrative apparatus of the state, the millet system provided nonMuslims with the opportunity to embody a separate identity that is characteristic of their
group, and thus to nurture their collective cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious
values. Namely, in that way in the Ottoman state, several different local identities were
created which were nurtured by the individual identities of the individuals, but which
had to be harmonized with the religious affiliation of both the individual and the group.
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Thus, each group or millet consisted of a population that, in addition to being part of a
state pre-national system, created its own identity 25 which, after the collapse of the
empire, transformed into a national one. The problem in the Balkans arises from a time
when the Orthodox millet, or ethnicities that are part of the Ottoman state, formed
nation-states in the 19th century, and they have such an intertwined history and
collective memory that it is reflected in a conflict of identities.
Conflict of identities occurs when more nations have the same heroes or myths in their
collective memory, and they use them to emphasize their values and to disparage the
values of the neighboring nation with which they share identity and historical features.
It is the Ottoman heritage of the Balkans (i.e., the millet system in which all modern
Balkan countries lived) that contributes to the development of nationalism in this area
today, because all nations and ethnicities in the region share a common history — a
collective memory and myths from the Ottoman period. The reason, of course, lies only
in the Ottoman division of the population into millets. Thus, according to Anthony
Smith, ordinary conflicts of (national) interests turn into cultural, moral and political
crusades or jihad that occupy the everyday political scene.26
Analyzing the millet system in the Ottoman state, it can be concluded that all the
subjects of the sultan, although divided according to their religious identity, still had
one unifying factor, and that is the so-called “Ottoman identity” — the loyalty to the
ruler and to the imperial administrative-bureaucratic apparatus. Although when it
comes to “Ottoman” identity it cannot be classified as national, nor as ethnic, it can be
said that it is in fact a socio-political identity especially in the Tanzimat27 period, where
it is categorized only as loyalty to the ruler, who in fact, had no authority over religious
matters in the country.
The Ottoman system can most easily be explained as an institutional-political
framework that contains religious inclusiveness of non-national elements called millets.
Namely, the millets themselves are defined as ethno-linguistic and ethnic groups.
Regarding this form of government, Kemal Karpat says: “The millet system actually
produces both religious universality and local parochialism”.28 This means that the
local units of the millet became an incubator for the development of ethnic-national
feelings among the population in the 19th century in the Balkans, resulting in uprisings
for liberation from the Ottoman rule of certain Balkan ethnicities.
Brown, L.C. (1995). ‘The Ottoman legacy in the Balkans’, in Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint
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In this context it can be said that the millet system itself over time turns into a generator
of ethnic and religious intolerance between the various groups in the Ottoman Empire,
and it can be defined as the beginning of Balkan nationalism.
The Ottoman millet system can be defined as a form of social organization in which
religious identity takes precedence over other identity features of each of the groups,
and especially in relation to ethnicity. This way of defining the millet system opens the
possibility for analysis in terms of which religions are accepted in the country, and
which religions are generally recognized by the imperial government in Constantinople.
If one examines in detail the millet system of the Ottoman state, one can see that all
monotheistic religions were recognized by the sultan, and thus they were able to create
local identities that have not an ethnic, but a unified religious character.
The very recognition of the religious identity of groups, as well as individuals, provided
them with a kind of “imaginary” mechanism for protection for all, except Muslims —
a mechanism that allowed different millets to self-determine in accordance with their
religious identities, and in the 19th century with the ethnic ones because the religious
identity in the empire gradually started becoming the basic identity feature of the
different ethnicities in it.
The practice of institutionalizing religious communities in the Ottoman state began
immediately after the conquest of Constantinople (1453) in 1454 and was established
by Sultan Mehmet II. The first created millet was the Orthodox one, followed by the
Armenian millet in 1461 and the Jewish one in the late 15th century. 29 Namely,
immediately after the institutionalization of each millet, its leader begins with a process
of unification of the features that unite the members of that millet.
What is interesting about the Balkans is that although most of the population in this part
of the empire is Orthodox and submissive to the Ecumenical Patriarch, in the late 18th
and throughout the 19th century the ethnic character began to dominate over the
religious. In fact, the dominance of ethnic over religious identity among the Balkan
ethnicities is the result of their centuries-long subordination, as well as the desire of
these ethnicities to promote the religious and ethnic identity values that are unique to
their group.
This domination of ethnic over religious identity in the 19th century resulted in a
struggle for secession and the formation of independent nation-states of the Balkan
peoples living within the Ottoman Empire.
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The centuries-old dominance of religious over ethnic identity within the millet system
in the Ottoman state created a general state of shared collective memory that for the
Balkan peoples opened the door to extreme nationalism that resulted in extremism. The
outcome is putting one's own ethnicity on a pedestal and humiliating one’s neighbor
with whom you share a common history. It is for this reason that Ottomanism and its
millet system can be defined as the basis of today's Balkan nationalism or Balkanism.
The Ottoman millet system of governance illuminates the basic difference between the
way the nation states were formed in Europe and in the Balkans. Namely, unlike Europe
where ethnic identity has an advantage in the formation of the nation, the Balkan nations
later in the 19th century began to enter the era of national awakening and realizing that
what actually makes the nation homogeneous and connects it is not the religion but the
identity of the group.30
If we need to define identity, the best definition for it is given by Anthony Smith; he
emphasizes that there are generally accepted features that identify all members of a
group, such as language, traditions, culture, values, common legal and economic
framework, and in some exceptional cases, religion.31
Thus, according to Kemal Karpat, this huge difference is due solely to the fact that
although the Ottoman Empire as a multiethnic state was able to create a unified identity,
the advantage that Muslims had in the existing millet system prevented other groups
from being embodied as on religious, as well as on ethnic grounds, to identify
themselves with the “Ottoman” imperial identity.32
Although the millet system in the Ottoman state is a result of its multiethnic and multireligious character, it can still be said that it turns into a generator for its disintegration.
What is even more frightening is that the millet system is becoming a generator for the
development of Balkan nationalism because the cultural and ethnic identities of the
groups in the empire have been neglected for centuries in favor of the religious ones.
The forcing of a religious identity resulted in an attempt to hegemonize the Hellenic
identity over the entire Orthodox population, which led to the rejection of the non-Greek
Orthodox population in the Ottoman state, and thus the beginning of its disintegration.
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The disintegration of the empire itself is due to the ethnic awakening of the various
groups that inhabited its territory; different ethnicities began to show intolerance not
only towards the central government in Constantinople, but also to the religious
authority that secretly tried to impose Hellenism as the only identity solution of the
entire Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire.
It is for these reasons that Ottomanism can be defined as a classic successor to
Byzantinism, as the Ottoman rulers unknowingly hegemonized Hellenism over the
entire Orthodox population through the Ecumenical Patriarch. Namely, similar as in
the Byzantine Empire from the period of the Palaiologos Dynasty (1259-1453), the
hegemony of Hellenism contributed to the disintegration of the state, in this case of the
Ottoman Empire.
The Ottoman Identity – Ottomanism
The Ottoman identity is the most complex form of identity that has ever existed in a
country. Namely, when it comes to “Ottoman” identity, it is not meant as a normal
national identity, but as a mixture of religions, cultures and languages that are not united
naturally but administratively by the sole ruler of the empire.33
Another interesting phenomenon concerning Ottoman identity is that it began to emerge
after the conquest of Constantinople by Sultan Mehmet II in 1453. In fact, when we
talk about Ottoman identity, we are not talking about a unified national identity; rather,
from the point of view of the liberal 34 theory of nations and identities, it is an
administrative identity that unites only the legal-political and economic framework in
the country.35
Religious unity for all Muslim subjects of the empire was fostered by the establishment
of the Sunni way of practicing Islam as the official state religion by Sultan Selim I in
1517. That is when he conquered the Memeluks in Egypt and with this victory, usurped
the title of caliph of Islam. Proclaiming himself as the caliph of Islam, Selim I not only
gave legitimacy to the Ottoman dynasty to rule the Muslims in the world,36 but also
tried to create a kind of unification between the various Muslim groups in the empire
such as the Turks, Persians, Arabs, Azeris and all other groups that had accepted Islam
as the official religion until then.

Itzkowitz, N. (1976). ‘‘The Ottoman Empire,’’ in Bernard Lewis, ed., The World of Islam. London:
Thames and Hudson. рр. 277.
34
Hutchinson, J. Smith, A.D. (1996). Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
35
Hobsbawn, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
36
Lewis, B. (1993). Islam and the West. New York City: Oxford University Press.
33

Comparative Civilizations Review

33

Ottomanism as a divided identity was inherited from the Seljuk Turks. After
conquering a large part of Asia Minor, as well as parts of the Caucasus, Iran, and the
Middle East, the Seljuks after the battle of Manzikert in 1071 realized that the
population living in this territory would not be so easily identified with the newly
imposed Turkish identity. For that purpose, the Seljuks accepted the Byzantine way of
imposing imperial power through religion, emphasizing the importance of the Islam in
the daily functioning of their state. However, due to the fact that in those territories
lived a population that could not fully identify with either Islam or Turkish culture, they
began to create the so-called administrative identity that in many ways is similar to the
Byzantine imperial one.
This administrative identity was later taken over by the Ottomans, who, like the Seljuks,
realized that only through the state apparatus could create a kind of identity through
which all subjects in the empire would be identified.37
Two things are characteristic of this Ottoman identity. The first one is that it is
constructed on the basis of Sunni Islam as a unifying element of the Muslim population
in the empire. This means that no matter how much the other non-Muslim communities
in the empire were respected, the imperial bureaucracy never regarded the non-Muslim
population as an integral part of the empire.
This kind of interpretation can be supported by the fact that everyone except the Muslim
millet were excluded from the construction of the Ottoman identity in the country. This
means that as early as the 16th century, the Ottoman government, both imperial and
bureaucratic, began with the construction of an artificially structured identity in the
empire that would aim to unite the Muslim population, but also to differentiate the same
from other non-Muslim groups in the empire.
This way of forming a state-regulated identity provided the basis for later divisions and
conflicts between the Balkan ethnicities.38 In fact, by practicing a state-constructed
identity as Ottomanism is constructed, it has provided the basis of today’s Balkanism.
The second characteristic that is crucial in the construction of Ottomanism is the
language. Language is one of the basic characteristics of each identity.
Wanting to unite the entire Muslim population in the country, the elite in the Ottoman
Empire through the imperial apparatus created an Ottoman-Turkish language which
was a mixture of Turkish, Farsi and Arabic.39
37
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However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, this Ottoman language failed to
remain the official language of present-day Turkey.
The Ottomans never took the Western way of determining their identity and nation.
This normally could not have happened naturally because the Ottoman Empire was a
multi-confessional and multiethnic empire in which no identity could be imposed as a
unifier for all the millets in the country.40 What the Ottomans really wanted to achieve
was the hegemony of the so-called Ottomanism which is analyzed above in this text.
By hegemonizing Ottomanism, as well as its Islamic character, the imperial government
wanted to achieve the greatest possible inclusion of the population, or at least of the
Muslim one.41
The modernization of Ottomanism began in the first half of the 19th century, with the
coming to power of Sultan Mahmud II and later his son Abdulmajid I. These reforms,
known in the Ottoman history as Tanzimat, in terms of identity mean transformation of
Ottomanism from a religiously constructed and state-implemented identity that referred
only to the Muslim population in the country, into a new Ottomanism that has a civic
concept — that is, the creation of an identity with which all the subjects of the Sultan
would be identified.
The civic Ottomanism that stems from the Tanzimat is in fact nothing more than the
last attempt of the Ottoman emperor to prevent the collapse of the empire. Namely,
after the secession of Greece in 1832 from the empire, the extension of a civil
Ottomanism was nothing but an attempt to persuade the other ethnicities in the empire
to consider themselves as part of the state, and thus to reduce the possibility of uprisings
for independence in both the Balkans and the Middle East.
Tanzimat was in fact the last attempt of the Ottoman sultans to save the empire from
collapse. Although this was impossible, the desire to survive still made these two
progressive and liberal Sultans to concede that the millet system did not build
Ottomanism, but only destroyed it. Namely, the millet system worked great in the
Middle Ages when, with the help of military force, the ethnicities and religious groups
were kept peaceful within the borders of the Ottoman Empire, 42 while imposing a
hegemonic religious identity over their ethnicities and a religious one that was
constantly underestimated despite the Ottoman identity. The last attempt to restore
historical Ottomanism was during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamit II, in order to prevent
secession of Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania due to the intensified movements for
national freedom.
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In any case, Ottomanism as an identity actually originates from the predecessor
empires— the Byzantine Empire or the Eastern Roman Empire.43 As the successor of
Byzantinism, Ottomanism contributed to the creation of that pejorative Balkan
nationalism, later defined as Balkanism. Thus, Ottomanism with its imperial and
hegemonic approach, similar to Byzantinism, contributed to the discord or nonidentification of other Balkan identities with the state or the administrative identity. As
a result, if it can be said that by hegemonizing the Hellenistic identity as superior to the
others, Byzantinism led to the collapse of the empire, it similarly can be said that
Ottomanism contributed to the birth of the conflict of identities among all Balkan
ethnicities.
Balkanism: An Ottoman Heritage
Unlike European nationalism, Balkan nationalism contains some elements that are
unique to the region. This kind of nationalism such as today’s Balkanism actually
accumulates44 symbols and myths not only of an ethnic but also of a religious nature.
With this in mind, it can be said that Balkan nationalism accumulates the ethnic and
religious attributes in order to create a nation of a certain group. This way of
accumulating religion in the identity is the result of more than 400 years of Ottoman
rule in the region.
If we look at the history, as well as what was written above in this text, we can conclude
that the millet system created by the Ottomans, and which functioned until the middle
of the 19th century, contributed to the penetration of the religion deeply into the identity
features of all Balkan groups. This means that in the Balkans, religion becomes a
feature of ethnicity that is later transformed into a national identity, not vice versa45 as
in Europe. Unlike the Balkans, in the rest of Europe, ethnic groups are embodied in the
religion. In the Balkans, on the other hand, the religion is a part that determines and, to
some extent, directs the development and improvement of the identity of ethnicities.
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of independent nationstates in the Balkans, an interesting situation arose in which all states, once formed,
began to create a national identity that would be different from that of its neighbors.
Thus begins the creation of the state-regulated nationalism which through the unified
bureaucratic-educational system in each Balkan country aims to form generations that
would boost their identity in relation to other neighboring identities.
This phenomenon of Balkan nationalism or Balkanism can be said to be the result of
the Ottoman way of governing.
43
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By not paying attention to the ethnic character that is specific to each group, but rather
by emphasizing the common religion of all Orthodox Balkan ethnicities, the Ottomans
created a hegemonic status of the Hellenistic identity in relation to the Slavic identities
in the Balkans. Through the Greek language and the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the
Ottomans managed to rule the Orthodox population in the region.
The problem arises at the moment when the Slavic ethnicities, no longer able to tolerate
the rank of a subordinate people in relation to the Greeks in terms of culture and other
ethnic features, begin a struggle for independence. The struggle for independence of all
Balkan peoples from the Ottomans is justified as a cause. What cannot be justified is
the fact that in each of these struggles, nationalism feeds on a certain group which would
have the task of distancing its own group from the others by raising on a pedestal its
own landmarks.46
So, by emphasizing the collective memory of their own group, as well as the myths of
the same, the Balkan peoples during their struggle for independence managed to create
fertile ground for discord on ethnic grounds with those with whom they were
neighbours and good friends until yesterday, living in the same empire. And when the
question arises: what has the Ottomans got to do with it? The answer is very simple: by
denying the ethnic cultural identity and separation of the ethnicities following the
example of Byzantine Empire, 47 the Ottoman Empire hegemonizes the Hellenistic
identity through the Orthodox religion.
Although this hegemony is probably unconscious and in order to more successfully hold
on the Orthodox population in chains, it can still be said that the Ottomans by modifying
the Byzantinism managed to create Ottomanism that makes the foundation for today’s
Balkanism.
Hatt-ı Hümayun, or the Reform Act of 1856, is a document passed by the Ottoman ruler
that guarantees equality to all the subjects in the empire on the basis of ethnicity, culture
and religion. Hatihumayun is actually the end of the millet system in the Ottoman
Empire. However, when this reform act was passed, the division between the ethnic
groups in the empire was so great that even its entry into force and its respect from the
ruling elites would not prolong the life of the Ottoman state or reduce the tensions
between the Balkan peoples.
Moreover, Serbia and Greece were already independent states and exerted a great
influence to change the identity values of the Orthodox population that still lived within
the empire.
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In fact, the cumulativeness of identity and nationalism in the Balkans comes to the fore
once again when, through the religious schools, the various Balkan states sought to
create new values for the Slavic population in the Ottoman Empire.
Another element of discord is the language and its use in the period when the Balkan
peoples lived within the Ottoman state. The use of the Greek language by the
Patriarchate of Constantinople, as the only language that recognizes Orthodoxy as a
millet in the Ottoman Empire, is a huge blow to the identities of the Balkan ethnicities.
This is in fact a direct favoring of Hellenism and degradation of the local identity
because through language the identity of a certain group is strengthened. The favoring
of the Greek language by the Patriarchate, with the approval of the Sultan, leads to a
state of repulsion towards Greek culture by the Slavic population, which by itself
generates a conflict of identities which contributes to the development of the specific
Balkan nationalism.
It can be concluded that if the Byzantinism is the basis of Balkan nationalism — that is,
it is the core of what is called the hegemony of one ethnic identity in relation to others
in a multinational state — then it can be said with certainty that Ottomanism is only a
prolonged phase of Byzantinism that does not lead to the current situation in the region.
When we say “situation” in the region, we mean the ethnic and religious intolerance
that was created in the early Middle Ages and is constantly nourished throughout
history, thanks to the specific past of all ethnicities that inhabit the Balkans. In any
case, what can be concluded is that Balkanism was not invented in the 20th or the 21st
century. In fact, Balkanism runs as a thread throughout the history of the ethnicities
that live in this territory and does not leave them the opportunity to reconcile with the
fact that they have a common past and the same or similar myths with which they are
embodied. Balkanism is the moment of discord between these groups when the same
heroes and myths from the collective memory are celebrated in different ways, and they
cannot be reconciled that, thanks to the common past, the heroes and myths have entered
the collective memory of all the groups in the Balkans.
Ottomanism, on the other hand, is the transition from Byzantinism to modern
Balkanism which, by favoring the religious over the cultural and ethnic affiliation,
manages to enable the ethnic groups in the region to no longer distinguish themselves
from their past and reject nationalism as a future. Although Ottomanism is just fiction,
as such it has contributed to today’s divisions and disagreements between the Balkan
nations as well as to the ongoing conflict of identities.
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